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4Abstract
This meta-analysis deals with 29 empirical studies on the trade and investment
impact of economic diplomacy (embassies, consulates and other diplomatic
facilities, investment and export promotion offices, trade and state visits). The
meta-regression results suggest that the significance of the coefficient of
economic diplomacy is more pronounced when studies use embassies as an
explanatory variable as compared to studies using consulates, trade missions,
state visits and export promotion agencies. If the primary dependant variable
under investigation is exports one may also expect to find more significant
coefficients then in an otherwise similar regression explaining the relation
between economic diplomacy and imports, total trade or foreign direct
investment. Furthermore empirical design factors play a role in the reported
results of the studies we reviewed. Studies based on a single country will in
general show lower significance.
Keywords
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5A meta-analysis of economic diplomacy and its effect
on international economic flows!1
1 Economic diplomacy: an introduction
Barriers to international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) remain large
despite the advances made in communication and transportation technology,
massively lower transportation cost and reductions in formal trade barriers.
Informal trade barriers, cultural and institutional differences and modus
operandus act as intangible barriers that create frictions similar to the well-
known traditional resistance factors (Disdier and Head, 2008, Head and Ries,
2006). Economic diplomacy, the topic of our investigation, is increasingly
being recognized as an instrument to deal with these intangible barriers to
trade (e.g. Bergeijk, 2009, Yakop and van Bergeijk, 2011). Economic
diplomacy typically is an interdisciplinary subject to the fields of international
economics, international political economy and the international relations
literature and is receiving increasing attention (Bergeijk, Melissen and Okano-
Heijmans 2011). Economic diplomacy aims to influence decisions on cross-
border economic activities pursued by governments and non-state actors
(Bayne and Woolcock, 2007, Okano-Heijmans, 2011) and involves the
activities of the government and its international networks. Economic
diplomacy can thus be defined as the use of government relations and
government influence in order to stimulate international trade and investment
and this activity covers a broad range of semi-permanent international
representations (embassies, consulates and other public sector business
support facilities), domestic institutions (investment and export promotion
offices), and diplomatic bilateral activities (trade and state visits).
Mainstream economists traditionally have been sceptical about economic
diplomacy and the efficacy of its instruments, especially where it concerns
export subsidies and export promotion agencies. Economic diplomacy, a tax-
funded activity, in neoclassical thought merely is a disruptive income transfer.
Seringhaus and Botschen (1991), for example, showed that the use of export
promotion is very limited and export promotion efforts do not address the
needs of exporters. Likewise, Gencturk and Kotabe (2001) found that export
subsidies make businesses more profitable, but at the same time have no effect
on their turn-over. In the same spirit export promotion agencies (EPAs) have
received considerable criticism, particularly in the 1990s. Influential World
Bank publications by Keesing and Singer (1991) and Hogan (1991), criticized
the establishment of EPAs especially in countries with high trade barriers
where export promotion would serve as a palliative; the effective first best
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented in 2010 at the 4th International
Biennale On Commercial Negotiation at Negocia, Paris, the European Trade Study
Group’s Copenhagen Conference 2011, the IDB workshop “The Effects of Trade
and Investment Promotion”, October 2012 and the 4th MAER-NET Colloquium,
University of Greenwich, September 2013. Comments by participants of the
conferences and Henri de Groot are gratefully acknowledged.
6solution is to lower trade barriers. As a result of these critical World Bank
studies many development institutions withdrew their support to EPA’s
(Lederman et al. 2006).
Interestingly, despite these criticisms economic diplomacy continued to
play an important role in commercial policy. Economic diplomacy has existed
for a long time and has always been considered relevant by policy makers
basically for four reasons. Firstly, cultural factors may make it necessary for
national governments to get involved in international transactions. This is
especially the case now that the former centrally planned economies account
for an increasing share of world trade. In these countries government is still
regarded as a natural partner in the economy. Secondly, state enterprises may
be the counterpart of a company operating in the international markets. This
creates the necessity for entrepreneurs to seek cooperation with their national
government to equalize the power balance and to improve its playing field.
Thirdly, (political) uncertainty about international transactions must often be
removed or reduced. Government involvement may signal that a transaction
will not raise political resistance. Finally, the information needed for
international transactions sometimes requires involvement of government
officials.
Economic diplomacy may serve as a toolbox to tackle specific manner of
market failures that hinder international transactions. Informational and/or
transparency problems increase the cost for exporting, importing and investing
internationally and hamper (the building of) trust that is necessary for
international economic transactions. Economic diplomacy lowers transaction
costs by enhancing mutual trust and providing information that private parties
have difficulty accessing due to information asymmetries. It is highly likely that
knowledge about export markets is under-produced from a societal point of
view, because appropriation is difficult if not impossible. Pioneer exporters
provide information to their competitors about the existence of a market,
distribution channels, etc. and their investments may be harvested by free
riding rivals (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). Governments may step in by
providing “unique, reliable and impartial access to information such as through
the global embassy network and other government channels and contact,
which become available through the government’s very long term and non-
commercial attachment to overseas markets” (Harris and Li, 2005, p. 74). In
addition to increased academic attention, economic diplomacy is also gaining
ground in policy-making. All these developments increase the importance of
knowledge about the (size) effects and significance of economic diplomacy.
Economic diplomacy is increasingly being recognized as a relevant topic in
empirical research in international economics, international political economy
and the international relations literature. Because the empirical work in the
field of economic diplomacy is still emerging, research results are not yet
conclusive. We take stock of this literature by providing a meta-analysis of 29
empirical studies published in the period 1986-2011. These studies provide us
with 1334 point estimates and 643 t-values regarding the impact of economic
diplomacy on international economic flows. We scrutinize the mixed evidence
that is provide by these studies, correcting for differences in research design,
7methodology, time frame and manner of data deployed in the 29 studies.2
Meta-analysis is a research method that enables researchers to synthesize and
summarize previously obtained empirical findings for a single research
question in a quantitative and statistically rigorous fashion. Meta-analysis is a
statistical approach in which the reported results are adjusted for the
characteristics of the identified primary studies. It therefore goes beyond the
traditional literature review.
The use of a meta-analysis in addition to a traditional review of the
literature has several advantages: a meta-analysis is more objective and
transparent than a traditional literature review because it systematically analyses
sources of (quantitative) variation from earlier studies. The method offers the
opportunity to present the results of several studies in a coherent framework
and to estimate an average meta-effect, which often cannot be unambiguously
determined on the basis of individual studies (Florax, De Groot, De Mooij,
2002). A meta-analysis especially adds value in emerging fields of research: the
primary studies address a similar research question and the meta-analysis allows
the researcher to quantify and unfold trends in empirical results that would
otherwise be difficult to detect. Meta-analysis also enables us to combine the
results from the different fields of research where economic diplomacy is
gaining ground like international relations, economics and international
political economy. This is particularly relevant only because the topic of
economic diplomacy should be studied from a multidisciplinary point of view
and because empirical studies so far have by and large been mono-disciplinary
in focus.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
empirical research in the field of international economics and international
political economy that addresses the impact of economic diplomacy on trade
flows and investment. We discuss the problems encountered in these studies.
Section 3 discusses the construction of our sample and provides descriptive
statistics. Section 4 sets out the design of the meta-analysis and Section 5
presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and offers
suggestions for future research.
2 Review of literature
Most studies in our sample use the gravity model that has a longstanding
history in analysing the international pattern of bilateral trade and investment
flows (Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010). The majority of studies in our sample use
economic diplomacy as one of the determinants of international trade and the
parameter estimate can be interpreted as the partial derivative of international
trade or investment with respect to the particular diplomatic instrument(s) that
is (are) investigated in the paper concerned. Actually this approach is already
2 Our sample size is comparable to meta-analyses that deal with other aspects of
international economics such as Görg and Strobl (2001) who analysed 21 studies and
23 observations or Diebel and Wooster (2006) who used 32 studies and 141
observations.
8present in the first application of the gravity model. Tinbergen (1962)
recognized the importance of political factors in international trade and
included (former) colonial ties as one of the explanatory variables in his
analysis of bilateral trade flows. Since the work of Tinbergen many studies have
been published that investigate the influence of diplomacy and international
politics on trade and investment flows.
Until the mid1990s, the methodology used for analysis still was rather
crude from today’s perspective due to limited computing power and data
availability. The studies predominantly pertained to cross section analysis of
events data based indicators to explain the development of bilateral trade
(Pollins, 1989a, 1989b, Bergeijk, 1992 and 1994, Polachek, 1997) and Foreign
Direct Investment (Nigh, 1986). The empirical works uncovered a positive
correlation between, on the one hand, trade and investment and, on the other
hand, diplomatic cooperation. Differences in the significance, strength and
sometimes the sign of the correlation, occurred for single year (Bergeijk, 1992,
1994) versus pooled cross sections (Pollins, 1989a, 1989b and Nigh, 1986) and
for developing versus developed countries (Nigh, 1986). Also the extent to
which countries were integrated in the world economy appeared to be relevant
(Pollins, 1989a) as well as the socio-political system (centrally planned versus
market economies; Bergeijk 1992).
Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakdown of the Iron
Curtain for some time apparently reduced research interest in the topic, but in
the mid-2000s economic diplomacy returned on the research agenda again. In
contrast with the earlier literature, researchers deployed panel data and used
more specific tools of economic diplomacy as explanatory variables. The
international network of countries (consisting of embassies, consulates, export
promotion offices and investment promotion offices) and the trade missions
on various levels, organized within this network, are the focal point of these
analyses.
The World Bank published studies on the effectiveness of investment
promotion (Morisset, 2003) and export promotion agencies (Lederman et al.,
2006). According to these studies investment promotion agencies and export
promotion agencies have a strong and statistically significant effect. The studies
claimed that on average a 10% increase in the budget of investment promotion
leads to a 7.5% increase of FDI flows (Morriset, 2003) and that each additional
dollar of export promotion, increases exports by 40 dollars for the median
agency (Lederman et al., 2006). The World Bank publications were followed by
other studies on the topic of export promotion, often also producing positive
and significant effects but generally of smaller size. Next to differences in the
reported size effects the empirical work that followed the World Bank
publications had a somewhat different and wider scope. In addition to the
significance and size effect of export promotion, studies dealt with the regional
effect of export promotion (Volpe Martincus et al. 2010a, Gil et al., 2008), the
effect of the level of development on the impact of export promotion (van
Veenstra et al., 2011) and the effect of export promotion on the extensive and
9intensive margin of trade3 (Gil et al. 2011, Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a,
2010b, Volpe and Carballo, 2011, Segura-Cayuela et al., 2008).
A second strand in the recent literature deals with the contribution of the
diplomatic service on trade and investment flows. Rose (2007) was the first to
publish on the macroeconomic level effects of the network of embassies and
consulates-general (Rose, 2007). The effect of the changes in the international
diplomatic network are studied by Afman and Maurel (2010) and the
heterogeneity in effects due to different forms of representation in this
network are analysed by van Bergeijk et al. 2011. Furthermore research
emerged on the use of the international network via organizing trade missions
including state visits (Nitsch, 2007, Head and Ries, 2006, and Creusen and
Lejour, 2011, 2012) .
The recent studies report positive and significant coefficients. Rose (2007)
finds that the opening of an additional embassy or consulate is associated with
6 to 10 per cent higher exports. Afman and Maurel (2010) calculate that the
opening of an embassy has a similar impact as a 2 to 12 percentage points
reduction in ad valorem tariff. Van Veenstra et al., (2011), however, find a
smaller effect of 0.5 to 0.9 per cent additional exports when increasing the
number of embassies and consulates by 10 per cent. The use of the diplomatic
network via trade missions also shows mixed results varying from an export
stimulating effect of 6 to 10 per cent for the US, France and Germany (Nitsch,
2007) to insignificant econometric outcomes for Canada (Head and Ries,
2006). Exploring micro data for the Netherlands, Creusen and Lejour (2011)
find an export promoting effect of trade missions of 5 to 20 per cent where the
higher number refers to the effect for low income countries, but their estimates
for missions to high income countries are insignificant. Additionally the
interaction between measures of economic diplomacy is explored. The type of
diplomatic representation seems to matter. Embassies have a larger impact on
trade than consulates, while honorary consulates on average do not add value
to trade (van Bergeijk, De Groot and Yakop, 2011). Also the effectiveness of
both embassies and consulates as well as export promotion agencies depends
on the level of development of the trade partners. The impact of economic
diplomacy seems to be strongest in North-South, South-South and South-
North trade and weak for the flows between rich (OECD) countries (van
Veenstra et al., 2011, Creusen and Lejour, 2012).
The role of economic diplomacy and its relation to FDI flows has received
less attention also since the mid-2000s. Next to the earlier mentioned
publication of Morriset (2003) on the role of investment promotion, work has
been done on the impact of the bilateral politic-diplomatic relation on FDI
flows. The studies show a positive and significant impact of cooperation
between countries, similar to the relation found for trade (Polachek et al.,
2007). Policies that increase economic security, such as similarity in foreign
policy, enhance U.S. FDI (Biglaiser and DeRouwen, 2007).
3 See Moons 2012 for an extensive review on the effect of economic diplomacy on the
margins of trade.
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Differences in the reported results may partially be explained by the
primary studies characteristics. A general observation is that analyses are often
constrained because of limited data availability and that frequently data sets had
to be built from scratch by the researchers by collecting primary data through
surveys, by inspecting a great many number of national websites and/or coding
of qualitative historical information. As a consequence the metrics of economic
diplomacy may vary. Also, some studies only relate to the trade and/or
investment activities of one source country, thus being country specific and
not allowing for generalisation. Clear examples are Head and Ries (2006) on
the effectiveness of Canadian trade missions Creusen and Lejour, (2011, 2012)
on Dutch foreign network and its activities and of Gil et al., (2008) and Gil et
al., (2011) that limit themselves to export of Spanish regions. The samples of
these studies are quite specific and general conclusions cannot be drawn on
such a narrow basis. The same may hold true for analyses done for only a
limited group of source countries. Up till now most data samples relate to the
more developed source countries. Since higher cultural and institutional
barriers typically exist at lower levels of development the sample should ideally
cover source and destination countries at different stages of economic
development. A related problem is the use of cross sections leading to year
specific outcomes. In order to deal with these issues our meta-analysis
combines the information of the individual studies in order to distil the general
pattern hidden in the individual studies.
3 The data
We constructed a database with the characteristics of studies that empirically
investigate the impact of economic diplomacy on international flows. The
starting point is the literature review in Bergeijk (2009). We followed up on the
references made in the studies that were surveyed by Bergeijk and also
searched the EconLit electronic database and the internet using Google
Scholar. This provided us with a list of published articles, books, working
papers and conference papers that investigate the effect of economic
diplomacy on trade and FDI flows. In our search we used broad keyword
listings with the following terminologies: economic diplomacy, diplomacy and
(international) trade, diplomacy and FDI, information barriers and diplomacy,
embassies, trade missions, consulates, export promotion institutions, export
promotion, investment promotion agencies and investment promotion
institutions.
Not all uncovered studies could be included in our sample. Qualitative
papers, mostly from the field of international relations, were not included since
we were searching for empirical research. Our initial search also delivered a
number of effectiveness studies published in the 1990s (Seringhaus and
Botschen, 1991, Seringhaus and Rosson, 1998), but these studies do not deal
with the impact of economic diplomacy on trade and investment flows. Also
excluded were studies based on surveys about successful export strategies at
the company level (Genctürk and Kotabe, 2001, Bernard and Jensen, 2004,
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Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2004 and Samsudoha and Ynus Ali, 2006). The
search, moreover, provided a limited number of micro data studies dealing
with the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade (Volpe
Martincus et al., 2010a,b, Volpe and Carballo, 2011 and Biesenbroeck et al.,
2011). These studies, mostly conducted by Inter-American Development Bank
researchers, primarily focus on the effects of trade promotion for Latin
American countries (Biesenbroeck et al., 2011 focus on the effect of trade
promotion in Canada). The margin of trade papers look into the development
of trade patterns of firms that are treated with economic diplomacy but the
studies cannot be included in our sample because they provide information on
how trade is being promoted by trade promotion and not on the question of
its impact on the level of bilateral trade. The studies typically show that trade
promotion increases the diversity of traded product, the volume of products
traded or a combination of both (Moons, 2012). The studies, moreover, report
results which are specific to the groups of assisted companies4 and do not
answer the question what the overall impact of economic diplomacy is. Our
initial search also provided us with a number of studies that used a logit or
probit model to estimate the relationship between economic diplomacy and
trade/FDI. In these models the dependent variable is usually a binary variable,
i.e. the analysis is concerned with estimating the change in the probability to
trade or invest abroad (see, for example, Alvarez, 2004). As such the results
from these models do not provide information on the size of the change in the
level of trade or FDI by the use of economic diplomacy as is the case in the
results of the rest of the studies.
Our final meta-analysis database consists of 29 studies investigating the
relationship between economic diplomacy and the impact on international
flows (see Table 1). All our studies investigate the impact of (some instrument
of) economic diplomacy, controlling for a wide range of potentially relevant
variables including distance between trading partners, markets size, common
borders, common language and preferential trade agreements. In the database
1334 coefficients on the effect of diplomacy and 643 t-values are reported.
Furthermore we registered the dependant variable of the primary study, i.e.
export, import, total trade or FDI, and the different instruments of diplomacy
taken into account in the literature we reviewed. In order to be able to control
for methodological differences we also included other study characteristics
such as the number of observations used for the primary studies regressions,
the year of publishing, the period under investigation and the econometric
method used. The metrics for economic diplomacy differ widely, i.e. economic
4 To arrive to more general statement the authors do apply statistical corrections to
correct for self-selection within the groups of firms supported by export promotion




Studies used in the meta-analysis and summary statistics for reported t values








Minimum t Maximum t Standard
deviation
Nigh (1986) Diplomatic Relation 1954-1975 504 4 5.26 4.79 2.61 8.86 2.31
Pollins (1989a) Diplomatic Relation 1955-75 552 14 2.56 2.45 1.90 4.39 0.65
Pollins (1989b) Diplomatic Relation 1960-1975 600 32 4.86 4.71 0.59 7.06 1.31
Summary (1989) Consulates 1978, 1982 66 8 2.22 2.30 0.39 4.03 1.11
Bergeijk (1992) Diplomatic Relation 1985 1560 4 5.72 6.31 3.08 7.18 1.57
Bergeijk (1994) Diplomatic Relation 1986 1560 4 6.38 7.25 3.20 7.80 1.89
Polachek (1997) Diplomatic Relation 1948-1978 n/a 1 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00
Morriset (2003) Investment Promotion Agency 2002 58 7 2.10 2.01 1.14 3.33 0.64
Keshk et al (2004) Diplomatic Relation 1950-1992 143792 2 1.89 1.89 0.92 2.86 0.97
Simmons (2005) Diplomatic Relation 1967-2000 1300 8 2.11 2.39 1.05 2.74 0.62
Head and Ries (2006) State Visits, Trade Missions 1990-2003 216969 32 1.10 0.19 -2.93 6.99 2.51
Lederman et al.(2006) Export Promotion Agency 2005 78 19 2.62 3.27 -0.27 5.53 1.78
Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) Diplomatic Relation 1966-2002 2335 4 1.31 1.07 0.15 2.93 1.05
Gil Pareha et al.(2007) Embassies, Consulates 2001-2003 912 49 4.78 5.08 -0.11 8.26 1.54
Gil et al. (2008) Embassies, Consulates 1995-2003 26098 64 3.75 2.71 -5.08 14.20 3.83
Nitsch (2007) State Visits, Trade Missions 1948-2003 18409 51 1.53 2.04 -1.59 4.20 1.67
Polacheck et al. (2007) Diplomatic Relation 1990-2000 5449 2 9.15 9.15 8.59 9.70 0.56
Rose (2007) Embassies, Consulates 2002-2003 4132 105 4.44 3.80 -1.69 16.50 3.42
Long (2008) Diplomatic Relation 1984-1997 217340 5 5.43 5.16 1.04 10.40 3.29
Segura Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) Embassies, Consulates 1999 2138 2 1.79 1.79 1.70 1.87 0.08
Afman and Maurel
(2010) Embassies, Consulates 2005 4269 46 2.68 1.63 -0.37 8.17 2.47
Hegre et al. (2010) Diplomatic Relation 1950-1992 279343 9 5.34 1.89 -9.60 15.26 7.25
Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a) Embassies, Consulates, Export Promotion Agency 1995-2004 n/a 72 5.19 2.79 -1.23 39.33 7.46
Creusen and Lejour (2011) Embassies, Consulates, Foreign Export Promotion Office,State Visit, Trade Mission 2002-2007 68600 9 3.16 3.63 1.55 4.38 1.11
Ferguson and Forslid (2011) Embassies, Consulates, Foreign Export Promotion Office,State Visit 1997-2007 1120 4 -1.76 -1.46 -4.19 0.08 1.67
Gil Pareja et al. (2011) Foreign Export Promotion Office 1993-2008 409684 34 2.43 2.45 -2.57 14.02 2.62
Veenstra et al. (2011) Embassies, Consulates, Foreign Export Promotion Agency 2006 1242 16 1.38 0.93 -2.00 5.60 2.12
Bergeijk et al. (2011) Embassies, Consulates 2005 3730 24 1.65 0.93 -2.50 10.22 3.10
Yakop and Bergeijk (2011) Embassies, Consulates 2006 3906 12 3.77 3.92 1.50 6.00 2.13
Full sample 643 3.21 2.96 -9.60 39.33 2.13
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diplomacy has been reported based on diplomatic event data5, the geography
of the foreign network of countries (embassies, consulates and foreign
branches of export and investment promotion offices), the activities deployed
by the foreign network of countries (trade missions and state visits) and finally
activities undertaken in the home market (export promotion and investment
promotion). Also substantial heterogeneity exists with respect to research
methods and dependant variables. We therefore created three categories of
moderator variables for further analysis: empirical design factors, dependant
variable characteristics and instruments of economic diplomacy. Table 2
provides an overview of the various primary study characteristics included in
our sample.
While building the database we were confronted with a mix of linear and
non-linear coefficients that, for consistent analysis, needed to be transformed
into elasticities if we wanted to say something about the size effect of
economic diplomacy. For calculating the elasticity from linear models or vice
versa we needed to know average values of the dependent and explanatory
variables, but a number of studies did not report this basic essential
information. Furthermore, a number of semi-elasticities were reported which
could not be used for size effect meta-analysing regressions. We therefore
decided to work with the reported or calculated t-values, because a t-statistic
(the estimated coefficient divided by its standard deviation) has no dimension
and often is reported or can be calculated from the usually reported statistics.
By doing so we bypassed the difficulties of differing units of measurement
making a size effect meta-analysis in its basic form impossible.
This bypass, however, comes at a clear cost. While 1334 coefficients are
reported in 30 studies only 643 t-values in 29 studies are reported or could be
calculated. We put a lot of effort in contacting the authors of the primary
studies in order to get the missing information (such as t-values or standard
errors). This in most cases, however, proved not to be successful. Because of
missing t-values, or information that would allow us to calculate t values (and
also information that would allow us to calculated elasticities) we had to drop
the Reuveny and Kang (1998) study all together.
The reported t-statistics as shown by Table 1 vary considerably between
studies. A number of studies have insignificant mean and/or median t-values
(Polachek, 1997, Keshk et al., 2004, Head and Ries, 2006, Biglaiser and
DeRouen, 2007, Nitsch, 2007, Segura Cayuela and Villarubia, 2008, Fergusson
and Forslid, 2011, van Veenstra et al., 2011 and van Bergeijk et al., 2011).
Others such as Head and Ries (2006) Gil et al. (2008) and Hegre et al. (2010),
however, report very significant t-statistics (both positive and negative). These
5 Papers investigating the influence of diplomatic relations based on political event
data can look into the effect of either more of less interaction between country pairs.
These are two sides of the same medal. The results of an analysis on less interaction is
of similar size but exactly the opposite of an analysis on more interaction. For sake of
comparison we are interested in more political interaction only. We therefor changed
the sign of the regressions that investigate less interaction.
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differences could be due to country specific factors, data characteristics,
differences in time period, differences in the dependant variable, and
alternative measures of research design. We will explore these sources of
heterogeneity in more detail in the next section by means of our meta-analysis,
but before we do so we provide a first picture of the potential impact of some
of the study characteristics. Following other meta-analyses (Sinani and Meyer,
2009, Havranek and Irsova, 2010, Mebratie and Bergeijk, 2013) we compute
composite t-statistics for a number of variables that we will later use as
moderator variables in our meta regression. The advantage of working with
larger sub samples of t-statistics compared to looking at individual results is
that small t-statistics could be significant in the aggregate even if they are not
significant in the primary study. This is intuitively plausible and follows from
the fact that for a larger sample, the sample standard deviation is a more
precise estimator of the population’s standard deviation (Newbold, 1995). The
uncertainty caused by the sample estimator as compared to the population’s
standard deviation is reduced as the sample size increases and the t-distribution
more and more fits the Standard Normal Distribution. Tests on the mean of
aggregate t-statistics are thus more powerful than looking into individual t-
statistics. We therefore computed the combined t-statistics by dividing the sum
of t-statistics over the square root of the number of observations in the full
sample. Let ti denote the t-statistic corresponding to the specific characteristic
of interest. N denotes the number of observations. Then the combined t-
statistic tc becomes:
This straight forward calculation of the combined t-statistic may,
however, be influenced by some studies that contribute particularly large
numbers of t-statistics, for example, because a lot of sensitivity analyses are
reported. Examples of such studies in our sample are Gil et al. (2007), Rose
(2007) and Volpe Martincus (2010a). To deal with the over representation of
parameters from such studies we introduce weights per observation.
Following Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Diebel and Wooster (2010),
normally distributed test statistics are obtained as follows:
Here wk represents the weight assigned to the k-th observation. The
weight depends on the total number of observations taken from a particular
study; smaller weights are assigned to studies that have larger numbers of
reported t-values. For example, the study of Keshk et al. (2004) contributes 2
observations. The weight assigned to each t-statistic is in this case 0.5. While if
a study contributes only one t-statistic, as in our sample Polachek (1997), the
weight employed to this observation is 1.
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Table 2
Moderator variables meta-regression analysis
Categories of moderator variables Moderator var name Discription
Empirical design factors FIXED EFFECTS Dummy, 1 if fixed effects estimate; 0 otherwise
NOTOLS Dummy, 1 if other than OLS estimate; 0 if OLS
COUNTRYSPECIFIC Dummy, 1 if primary sample is country specific; 0 otherwise
ENDOGENEITY Dummy, 1 if primary analysis corrects for endogeneity; 0 otherwise
GRAVITY Dummy, 1 if primary regression is gravity model; 0 otherwise
PANEL Dummy, 1 if panel data; 0 if cross-section data
PRE2000 Dummy, 1 if primary study is published before 2000; 0 otherwise
Observations Number of observations in the dataset of primary study
Dependant variable EXPORT Dummy, 1 if exports is dependant variable primary study; 0 otherwise
IMPORT Dummy, 1 if imports is dependant variable primary study; 0 otherwise
FDI Dummy, 1 if foreign direct investment is dependant variable primary study; 0 otherwise
TOTALTRADE Dummy, 1 if total trade is dependant variable primary study; 0 otherwise
Instrument of diplomacy EMBASSIES Dummy, 1 if embassies is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
CONSULATES Dummy, 1 if consulates is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES Dummy, 1 if embassies and consulates is included as 1 group in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
FOREIGN EPA Dummy, 1 if foreign export promotion office is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
EIPA Dummy, 1 if export/investment promotion agency is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
DIPLOMATIC RELATION Dummy, 1 if diplomatic relation is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
STATEVISITS Dummy, 1 if visits by head of state is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
TRADEMISSION Dummy, 1 if visits by minister of other representative is included in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
TRADE MISSIONS TOTAL Dummy, 1 if state visits dummy is 1 or trade mission dummy is 1; 0 otherwise
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Table 3
Aggregate t-statistics for the 29 studies
Using median t stat
from each study




tc N tc N tc N tw N tw N
Full data set 16.7 29 88.6 643 76.1 580 42.3 643 36.5 580
Empirical design factors
Fixed effects 10.1 14 60.1 256 49.3 236 21.0 256 15.6 236
Country specific 8.0 12 53.7 306 50.6 277 27.4 306 25.9 277
OLS 13.0 14 57.4 279 51,0 252 39.7 279 38.0 252
Endo 10.3 15 78.3 455 63.5 402 26.9 455 22.8 402
Gravity 14.5 20 86.5 579 73.2 519 45.1 579 39.4 519
Dependant variables 12.5 19 80.2 484 67.3 433 49.6 484 45.1 433
Imports 5.4 7 30.2 115 31.0 112 16.9 115 17.3 112
Exports 12.5 19 80.1 490 67.8 435 34.1 490 31.8 435
Total Trade 6.3 4 20.0 21 9.9 17 11.9 21 7.9 17
FDI 8.5 4 14.4 17 12.4 16 16.7 17 13.5 16
Economic Diplomacy
Characteristics
8.5 12 57.3 281 52.6 268 42.5 281 39.4 268
Embassies & consulates 8.4 9 53,8 209 51,3 201 22,0 209 20,6 201
Embassies 15.9 4 44.4 38 27.7 29 43.1 38 23.7 29
Consulates 5.4 5 16.2 72 17.4 68 19.2 72 19.6 68
Foreign EPA 3.8 4 26.5 90 23.8 76 9.6 90 9.5 76
EPA/IPA 4.5 4 38.0 62 19.7 53 23.3 62 15.8 53
Trade Missions 3.1 2 5.3 20 7.0 17 7.3 20 8.0 17
State Visits -0.7 3 11.7 69 15.1 59 -0.2 69 13.5 59
Diplomatic relation 19.2 9 38.3 60 33.4 56 27.4 60 20.4 56
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Results for aggregated and weighted aggregated t statistics are presented in
Table 3. We did calculations on the full sample of studies as well as a sub
sample excluding outliers to check the robustness of the calculations. For the
sample excluding outliers we dropped the 5% smallest and largest
observations, leaving a total number of 580 t-statistics included in the analysis
without outliers. Table 3 shows that the median t-statistics for all the tested
characteristics is always statistically significant except for State Visits. This is
basically caused by the median t-value of Ferguson and Forslid (2011), but note
that Head and Ries (2006) also have a number of insignificant t-values. The
State Visits t-statistic based on the full sample excluding outliers always shows
significant aggregate t-values. The weighted t-statistic is however negative. This
is caused by the dynamics resulting from the weighing process. Studies that
contribute only a limited number of observations have heavy weights to each
individual contribution. In this case relative heavy weights are assigned to the
negative t-values from the Ferguson and Forslid study because this particular
study only has 4 observations in the total database.
Across studies the use of export as a dependant variable is associated with
more significant effects of economic diplomacy than studies that use imports,
total trade or FDI as dependant variable. The number of observations related
to FDI flows is remarkably low.
When it comes down to the economic diplomacy characteristics, i.e. the
variable used to explain the effect of economic diplomacy, studies that analyse
embassies and consulates on average tend to generate more significant
outcomes than state visits, trade missions, export promotion offices and the
more general diplomatic relation measure. The weighted aggregate t-statistic
does also point towards a tendency to find relatively significant results for
export and investment promotion agencies.
Table 3 illustrates the extent of heterogeneity in bivariate analyses, both
for empirical design, the definition of the dependant variable and the economic
diplomacy characteristics. The next step is to investigate this in a multivariate
setting. We do so by doing a meta-analysis on our collected sample of t
statistics.
4 Design of the meta-analysis
A meta-analysis combines several studies of similar design and investigates
consistencies and discrepancies of their results. The essence of meta-analysis is
to obtain a single estimate of the effect of interest from some statistic observed
in each of several studies (Bradburn et al., 1998). This methodology is well
established in several academic fields, among which medicine, psychology and
increasingly also economics. The technique provides revised interpretations of
earlier research and is often useful to help indicate priorities for future research
(Meyer and Sinani, 2009).
We focus on the t-statistic of the coefficient that represents the impact of
economic diplomacy on international flows and the influence several study
characteristics have on this statistic. Our approach helps to find out the effects
of study characteristics on the sign and significance of the estimated effect of
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economic diplomacy on international flows. Equation (3) provides a way for
estimating how primary study characteristics influence the likelihood of finding
significant effects of economic diplomacy on international flows.
P(yij=1)=α0+β1OBSERVATIONSij+β2NOTOLSij+
β3COUNTRYSPECIFICj+β4GRAVITYEQUATIONj+β5PRE2000j+
β6ENDOGENEITYj +β7,…,10 [primary dependant variableij]+β11,…,17 [instruments of
diplomacyij]+εij (3)
Where yij is a binary variable that serves as the dependent variable. yij takes
the value of 1, if the coefficient of the i-th regression in article j is significant
(we will distinguish between the 5% or 1% level). And, yij = 0 if not. The
relation between the dependent and the explanatory variables will be estimated
with a logistic regression. Logit-analysis makes it possible to calculate the
probability P that a specified use or availability of economic diplomacy yields a
significant t stat. If this probability exceeds 0.5, a significantly t value is
‘predicted’. We distinguish between 3 sets of explanatory variables: primary
dependent variable, and economic diplomacy instrument(s) investigated and
correct for various empirical design and quality factors (see the classification
and description in Table 2).
4.1 Empirical design and quality factors
The empirical design factors included in equation 3 are COUNTRYSPECIFIC,
NOTOLS, PRE2000, GRAVITYEQUATION, ENDOGENEITY and
OBSERVATIONS. These variables capture the fact that a study deals with one
country only, the effect of the estimation method, the period of publication,
whether or not the equation in the primary study was a gravity model and the
number of available observations, respectively.
4.2 Primary dependent variable
We classify the explanatory variable in the original studies with dummy
variables for EXPORT, IMPORT, FDI and TOTALTRADE. They indicate
what explanatory variable was used in the primary study regression. Of the
literature under review 17 regressions deal with direct investment, 21 with total
trade, 115 with imports and 484 with exports.
4.3 Instruments of economic diplomacy
The economic diplomacy characteristics tested for in equation 3 include
mutually exclusive and exhaustive dummies for the instrument of economic
diplomacy used in the given studies. The economic diplomacy characteristics
are EMBASSIES, CONSULATES, EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES,
FOREIGNEPA, TRADEMINISTERS, PMORROYAL, EIPA and
DIPLOMACY. These variables respectively capture whether the economic
diplomacy coefficient pertains to embassies, consulates, embassies and
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consulates as one combined explanatory variable, export promotion offices
abroad, trade mission, state visits, export or investment promotion agencies or
the diplomatic relation as a proxy for economic diplomacy.
Next to the probability of finding a significant t-statistic we also
investigate the influence of study characteristics on the magnitude of the t-
statistic. We therefore use a second meta-regression analysis, regressing the
reported t-statistics obtained from the literature under review on earlier
mentioned empirical design factors, the choice of the explanatory variables and




β6ENDOGENEITYj +β7,…,10 [primary dependant variableij]+β11,…,17 [instruments of
diplomacyij]+εij (4)
Where Yij is the value of the t-statistic of the economic diplomacy
coefficient derived from the jth regression in the ith article, β0 represents the
random effect that control for the commonality and dependency of estimates
within and across studies and εij is the error term (Meyer and Sinani, 2009). The
explanatory variables in equation (4) are similar to those defined for equation
(3)
We present OLS and random effects estimates of equation (4) for the sake
of comparison. The random effects model is, however, our preferred
estimation. The random effects models use more realistic assumptions about
the effect size, as compared to a fixed effects model. Under fixed effects the
effect size of a given variable is assumed to be homogenous across studies, i.e.
the fixed effect model assumes that there is one true effect for all the studies in
our sample (Vevea and Hedges, 1998). All the observed differences are in that
case caused by sampling error. Given the diversity in our instruments of
economic diplomacy, differences in countries analysed in the primary studies
and the substantial variety of time periods investigated, among other reasons,
we want to allow the t statistic of economic diplomacy to vary from study to
study. Random effects allows for these different t-statistic per study6 which we
find more realistic given the diversity of the studies under review.




5.1 Logit estimates of factors explaining economic
diplomacy significance
Table 4 presents the logit coefficient estimates of equation (3). In our
regression analysis the reference case is a primary study that measures the
impact of foreign representation (embassies and consulates) on exports. Both
these reference variables are the most used in their specific group of factors
included in our econometric analysis.
Table 4
Logit estimates on the significance of economic diplomacy
Logit Logit Random Effects Logit
5% 5% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Observations (10^5) 0.201 0.548** 0.548**
(0.83) (2.17) (2.17)
NOTOLS 0.551** 0.157 0.557** 0.625* 0.678*** 0.625*
(2.35) (0.46) (2.52) (1.74) (2.60) (1.74)
COUNTRYSPECIFIC -0.223 -0.432 -0.644** -0.621 -0.832** -0.621
(-0.84) (-0.95) (-2.54) (-1.39) (-2.53) (-1.39)
EDNOGENEITY 0.432* 0.268 0.792*** 0.971** 0.528 0.971**
(1.68) (0.72) (2.99) (2.40) (0.84) (2.40)
GRAVITYEQUATION 0.435 0.237 1.083*** 1.563*** 1.558** 1.563***
(1.03) (0.40) (2.72) (2.59) (2.00) (2.59)
PRE2000 2.109*** 2.381*** 1.909*** 2.639*** 1.668 2.639***
(3.06) (2.94) (2.94) (3.25) (1.59) (3.25)
TOTALTRADE -1.207* -1.180 -2.087*** -2.483*** -2.736** -2.483***
(-1.67) (-1.52) (-2.97) (-3.13) (-2.32) (-3.13)
IMPORT -0.819** -0.673** -1.053*** -1.013*** -0.938** -1.013***
(-2.51) (-1.97) (-3.05) (-2.77) (-2.50) (-2.77)
FDI -0.297 -0.533 -0.276 0.122 0.00565 0.123
(-0.40) (-0.70) (-0.37) (0.16) (0.00) (0.16)
EMBASSIES 0.743 -0.364 1.320** 0.197 1.972** 0.197
(1.31) (-0.50) (2.27) (0.26) (2.45) (0.26)
CONSULATES -1.463*** -2.844*** -1.413*** -2.994*** -0.891 -2.994***
(-4.10) (-5.28) (-4.01) (-5.57) (-1.50) (-5.57)
FOREIGN EPA OFFICE -0.530* -1.338*** -0.254 -1.540*** -0.933 -1.540***
(-1.66) (-2.95) (-0.83) (-3.48) (-1.55) (-3.48)
TRADE MISSION -1.543*** -2.137*** -1.387** -3.254*** -0.720 -3.254***
(-2.94) (-3.11) (-2.42) (-4.17) (-0.78) (-4.17)
STATE VISIT -1.269*** -1.784*** -1.424*** -2.669*** 0.0903 -2.669***
(-3.41) (-3.36) (-3.80) (-4.72) (0.09) (-4.72)
EPA/IPA -0.507 -1.079 -0.453 -0.777 0.0226 -0.777
(-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.25) (-1.05) (0.05) (-1.05)
DIPLOMACY 0.342 -0.372 0.867 -0.233 1.372 -0.233
(0.52) (-0.44) (1.35) (-0.28) (1.38) (-0.28)
Constant 0.344 1.475* -0.928* -0.741 -1.371 -0.741
(0.62) (1.66) (-1.72) (-0.83) (-1.48) (-0.83)
N 643 416 643 416 643 416
Speudo r sqr 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.23
Correct predictions % 72.01% 72.36% 68.85% 73.08%
Sensitivity 89.73% 85.82% 81.49% 74.55%
Specificity 34.15% 47.97% 51.96% 71.35%
False positives 65.85% 52.50% 48.04% 28.65%
False negatives 10.27% 14.18% 18.51% 25.45%
t statistics in parentheses * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The models show the relation between the empirical design, the
dependent variable under investigation and the characteristics of economic
diplomacy with the likelihood of finding statistically significant coefficients for
economic diplomacy. We investigate two variants: significance at the 5% level
and better (model 1 and 2) and at the 1% level and better (model 3, 4, 5 and 6),
respectively.
Model 1, 3 and 5 are based on the full sample of studies and observations.
Model 2, 4 and 6 are based on a smaller sample of 27 studies and 416
observations. The difference is due to the fact that some of the primary studies
do not report the number of observations used for each reported regression.
Two studies, Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a) and Polacheck (1997), drop out
entirely because the number of observations used for the regressions in their
papers is not provided. Likewise, observations of Rose’s (2007) extensive
sensitivity analyses can no longer be included when accounting for the number
of observations.7
With respect to the study characteristics of the surveyed literature, country
specific studies have a smaller probability of producing significant coefficients
for economic diplomacy as compared to studies that investigate the influence
of economic diplomacy using a multiple country model. These results are
robust both at the 5% and 1% significance levels. However, this effect could
be driven by the studies of Rose (2007) and Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a)
because when these studies are dropped from our sample the significance of
the country specific dummy disappears.
Older studies, that is studies conducted before the 2000s are significantly
more likely to have produced positive and significant results at the 1%
significance level and better. The same can be said for econometric
investigation into the effect of economic diplomacy that use larger datasets and
primary studies that use a gravity equation.
Corrected for the empirical design factors the choice of the dependent
variable seems to be significantly associated with a greater likelihood of finding
significant results for economic diplomacy at the 5% level and better. Primary
studies that use exports as dependant variable tend to find more significant
results than studies using the total trade flow or imports as dependant variable.
Studies investigating the effect of economic diplomacy on foreign direct
investment flows do not differentiate significantly from studies using export as
dependant variable in their likelihood of producing significant results.
The characteristics of economic diplomacy have a strong and significant
impact on the probability that a primary study. Compared to primary studies
that use embassies and consulates (the reference group) most studies are less
likely to find a positive and significant t-statistic. Exceptions are studies that
use only embassies (rather than embassies and consulates) as explanatory
variable which are associated with a higher likelihood of producing significant
results under some specifications. Furthermore, the results for studies using
7 Rose reports numbers of observations for all regressions but not for the sensitivity
analyses
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diplomacy are not statistically different from those using embassies and
consulates.
The results bring to the table an interesting finding. When testing for the
influence of economic diplomacy, embassies and consulates are until now most
frequently treated as one group. Our results however indicate that there is
significant difference in the likelihood of finding significant results for the
group as compared to the individual factors. By taking embassies and
consulates as one group much relevant insights may be lost and results of one
of the two factors may dominate the result for the entire group.
To test the models 1- 4 presented in Table 4 on their discriminatory
accuracy we look into the percentage of correct and false predictions of our
specified logit models. Adding the observations variable improves the
goodness-of-fit. Model 1, predicts significance of economic diplomacy at the
5% level and better correctly in 72% of the cases. Adding the variable
OBSERVATIONS (model 2) leads to a small increase of correctly classified
outcomes. The logit models 3 and 4 predicting significance at the 1% and
better level show similar, but more pronounced, dynamics. Adding
OBSERVATIONS increases the correctly classified outcomes from 69% to
73%.
We investigated the Sensitivity and Specificity of our logit models (see
Table 4). Sensitivity, the true positive rate, measures the correctly identified
proportion of actual positives. In this case true positives are the predicted
significant coefficients for economic diplomacy. Specificity measures the
proportion of negatives, i.e. insignificant coefficients of economic diplomacy,
which are correctly identified as such. As may be expected the models that
include the OBSERVATIONS variable perform better on both sensitivity and
specificity.8
The performance of model (1)-(4) to correctly classify economic
diplomacy coefficients as significant or insignificant can also be shown
graphically by analysing the ROC curve and the area under the ROC curve.
The ROC curve is created by plotting the fraction of true positives out of the
positives versus the fraction of false positives out of the negatives. This is
depicted in graph 1 and 2. The 45 degree line represents the results of a
random draw. The greater the area under the ROC curve, the dotted line in
graph 1 and 2, the better the global performance of the diagnostic test. A
perfect diagnostic test would yield an area under the ROC curve of 1,
representing 100% sensitivity (no false negatives) and 100% specificity (no
false positives). Models (2) and (3) perform relatively well with area’s under the
ROC curve of approximately 80%.
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5.2 Determinants of magnitude of t-statistic economic
diplomacy coefficient: A random effects model
To get a more enhanced understanding of the manner in which several study
characteristics influence the significance of studies in the field of economic
diplomacy we do an additional regression analysis on the magnitude of the t-
statistic. Table 5 presents the results for the ordinary least squares and random
effects estimation of equation (5). For model 3 and 6 the sample without the
5% most extreme observations is used.
The baseline estimate again uses exports as reference for the dependant
variable and embassies and consulates as reference for the instrument of
diplomacy under investigation in the primary study. The references for the
empirical design factors are based on studies using standard OLS regression
models based on multiple country databases published after 2000.
Results are reported for OLS (model 1,2,3) and random effects (model 4,
5, 6). Model (2), and (5) test the robustness of the model by adding the
observations variable, which as mentioned earlier restricts our sample of t-
statistics. Models (3) and (6) exclude the 5% most extreme observations in
order to test for robustness with respect to outliers.
Again we find that empirical design factors play an important role in the
reported results of the primary studies. Primary studies conducted on a single
country basis will in general show a lower significance of the coefficient. The
OLS and Random Effects models provide evidence that studies published
before the 2000s produce higher t-values. Studies that use a larger number of
observations are a priori expected to find higher t-statistics: as the number of
observations increases the uncertainty caused by the sample estimator as
compared to the population’s standard deviation is reduced. This is reflected in
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furthermore see that more complex regression models produce more
significant coefficients than primary studies using OLS. Empirical studies using
the gravity equation seem to produce more significant results. Model 5 and 6
however shows that this conclusion is driven by sub samples in our t statistic
database. If we allow the t-statistic to vary between studies in the random
effects model the GRAVITYEQUATION and ENDOGENEITY variables
lose their significance.
Table 5
The effect of economic diplomacy study characteristics on the magnitude the t value
OLS Random Effects
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
Observations (10^5) 0.994*** 0.539** 1.73*** 1.23***
(3.75) (2.57) (4.10) (3.58)
NOTOLS 1.134*** 0.817** 0.712** 1.040*** 0.483 0.696**
(3.32) (2.32) (2.55) (2.77) (1.15) (2.09)
COUNTRYSPECIFIC -0.645* -0.983** -0.637* -1.487*** -1.385* -1.190**
(-1.67) (-2.20) (-1.84) (-3.11) (-1.78) (-2.04)
ENDOGENEITY 1.975*** 1.391*** 0.672** 1.191 0.919 0.533
(4.85) (3.44) (2.00) (1.16) (0.89) (0.68)
GRAVITYEQUATION 3.090*** 1.418** 1.665*** 2.899** 1.064 1.331
(5.04) (2.39) (3.54) (2.28) (0.80) (1.32)
PRE2000 2.120** 2.706*** 2.575*** 1.229 2.857* 3.123***
(2.21) (3.36) (4.10) (0.77) (1.85) (2.69)
TOTALTRADE -1.426 -0.871 -1.968*** -2.239 -1.566 -2.110*
(-1.31) (-1.09) (-3.15) (-1.24) (-0.98) (-1.79)
IMPORT -0.638 -0.370 -0.633** -0.160 -0.103 -0.338
(-1.32) (-1.05) (-2.35) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-1.16)
FDI 1.447 1.631** 0.934 1.431 2.252 1.665
(1.38) (2.10) (1.57) (0.78) (1.33) (1.33)
EMBASSIES 3.666*** 1.212* 1.042* 4.182*** 1.888 1.667
(5.33) (1.70) (1.92) (5.22) (1.22) (1.47)
CONSULATES -1.494*** -3.116*** -2.803*** -0.540 -2.333 -2.101*
(-2.69) (-5.88) (-6.92) (-0.70) (-1.58) (-1.96)
FOREIGN EPA OFFICE 0.256 -1.037** -0.739* -1.520* -2.484*** -0.910
(0.51) (-2.18) (-1.94) (-1.72) (-3.73) (-1.64)
TRADE MISSION -2.224*** -4.494*** -2.760*** -1.415 -2.303** -1.376
(-2.63) (-5.94) (-4.63) (-1.05) (-2.13) (-1.58)
STATE VISIT -2.905*** -4.094*** -2.780*** -1.316 -1.968* -0.748
(-5.06) (-7.63) (-6.45) (-1.01) (-1.81) (-0.80)
EPA/IPA 2.190*** -1.454* -0.547 2.937*** -1.195 0.135
(3.74) (-1.79) (-0.85) (4.27) (-0.93) (0.13)
DIPLOMACY 1.786* -0.694 -0.678 2.182 -0.271 -0.440
(1.87) (-0.81) (-1.04) (1.47) (-0.18) (-0.39)
Constant -1.279 1.809** 1.845** -0.542 1.695 1.379
(-1.52) (1.99) (2.58) (-0.35) (1.05) (1.12)
N 643 416 374 643 416 374
Adj R2 0.20 0.29 0.33
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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The choice of the dependent variable is weakly related to the magnitude of
the t-statistic. After controlling for various empirical design factors the studies
that use import and total trade instead of exports as dependant variable seem
to de deliver coefficients with lower t-statistics. These findings are however not
robust across specifications. Although the direction of the coefficient for the
two variables is always negative. Not all coefficients are significant.
The instrument of diplomacy used in the primary study has significant
influence on the significance of the coefficient in the primary study. If the
primary study uses embassies as a proxy for economic diplomacy, higher t-
values will be found. If on the other hand ‘lower’ forms of foreign
representation, i.e. consulates and foreign locations of export promotion
offices, are subject of the study, the significance of the coefficient in the
primary study will be significantly lower. The results give a further indication
that studies taking embassies and consulates as one explanatory variable may
lead to a problematic generalisation about the effectiveness of the diplomatic
network. Our regression analyses show that regressions using embassies
generate more significant coefficients than the embassies and consulates
benchmark. Consulates on the other hand are systematically associated with
lower levels of significance. Grouping the two (embassies versus consulates)
into one (embassies and consulates) thus leads to an average significance that is
too high for consulates and too low for embassies.
Of the other instruments of diplomacy the t-statistic of the diplomatic
relation variable does not seem to differ significantly from the t-statistic of
embassies and diplomacy. The remaining proxies for economic diplomacy, i.e.
trade missions, state visits, export and investment promotion offices, are
systematically related to a lower magnitude of the t-statistic in comparison with
primary studies that investigate the impact of diplomacy on international trade
and investment flows using embassies and consulates.
One contribution of this paper us that this is the first meta-analysis on the
effects of instruments of economic diplomacy on international economic
flows. Our findings are to some extent comparable to other meta-analyses
from the field of economics in the sense that we also find that research design
is an important determinant for significance (and magnitude) of the particular
subject under econometric investigation (compare, Sinani and Meyer, 2009,
Havránek and Iršova ,2010, Mebratie and Bergeijk, 2012 and Lazzaroni and
Bergeijk 2013).
We observed several features that deserve attention in future research,
specifically considering empirical design. We have seen various authors that use
embassies and consulates as one and the same instrument of diplomacy. Our
analysis however indicates that the significance of embassies and consulates
move in opposite directions. By grouping this two forms of foreign presence
into one, the authors may unintentionally lose a lot of the variance that exists
between the two. This may lead to false generalisations about the effect of
foreign presence on international economic flows. The same could be said




Governments around the world are increasingly involved in economic
diplomacy and this article tried to establish if the use of this instrument makes
sense empirically. The first questions that need to be answered are whether
economic diplomacy has a significant effect on trade and investment flows and
what the sign of that relationship is. Unfortunately the emerging literature on
the impact of economic diplomacy does not provide an unambiguous answer
yet. We have provided further insights into this issue by means of a meta-
analysis of the significance of the coefficients of economic diplomacy. We
analysed 29 studies on the topic of economic diplomacy and investigated what
study characteristics influence the likelihood of finding a positive and
significant t-statistic and what characteristics influence the magnitude of the t-
statistic.
Our econometric analysis shows that reported effects of economic
diplomacy on trade and investment in individual studies are sensitive to model
specification. Studies that use embassies as a proxy for economic diplomacy
tend to produce higher t-values. The same may be stated for studies conducted
before the 2000s, i.e. studies that use diplomatic cooperation and for studies
that investigate the influence of visits by the heads of state. Higher quality data
samples also improve the significance. We find that single country studies and
studies that use consulates as an explanatory variable have lower observed t-
values.
Our analysis also has valuable lessons for future research. The first thing
we note is that the research on the influence of economic diplomacy of FDI is
very limited. Of the total of 643 regressions we investigated, only 17
regressions dealt with the effect of economic diplomacy on FDI flows. It
would be interesting to see more material on this topic especially given the fact
that numerous governments do see a role for economic diplomacy in
stimulating FDI.
Furthermore there is a clear cut case for improving the availability for
data and increasing the country coverage of economic diplomacy data. Our
advice is not only to use bigger datasets but also for authors to report more
about the data they have used. This makes comparison between studies a lot
more transparent. Also the specification of instruments of diplomacy deserves
more rigorous attention. We encountered various studies that, to our opinion,
used rather crude grouping of instruments. A number of studies treated
embassies and consulates as instrument of diplomacy. We however showed
that embassies produce more significant coefficients for their effect on trade
and investment flows as compared to consulates and other foreign
representations of lower order.
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